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LAY JUDGES AND LABOR COURTS:   
A QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 
Pete Burgess†, Susan Corby,†† and Paul L. Latreille†††  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article looks at lay judges in first instance labor courts in five 
European countries:  France, Germany, Great Britain (not the United 
Kingdom because the arrangements in Northern Ireland are slightly 
different), Ireland, and Sweden.  This interest is prompted by two main 
developments that have raised the significance of judicial means for 
resolving individual rights disputes.  First, the period since the 1970s has 
seen a major increase in the volume and impact of individual statutory 
employment rights, partly as a result of national employment legislation and 
partly emanating from the legislative activity of the European Union in the 
employment sphere, as all five countries covered here are E.U. Member 
States.  Second, traditionally the protection of individual employees at the 
workplace and the resolution of grievances was one of the key roles 
exercised by trade unions in these countries.  During the last half century, 
however, there has been a substantial decline in trade union density in all 
these countries, with the exception of Sweden where the decline has been 
relatively small.1  This has been paralleled, although not directly, by a fall 
in the coverage of the workforce by collective agreements, and in particular 
those concluded at the industry level.2  These two factors taken together 
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 1. AMSTERDAM INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED LABOUR STUDIES, Jelle Visser, ICTWSS Database on 
Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 
Amsterdam, http://www.uva-aias.net/208 (last visited Dec. 8, 2013). 
 2. In the United Kingdom, for example, there is broad alignment between collective agreement 
coverage and union density.  In France, despite low union density, collective bargaining coverage is over 
90%.  This is due to the continued application of industry bargaining and the extension of industry level 
agreements to nonsignatory employers through administrative processes.  See SUSAN CORBY & PETE 
BURGESS, ADJUDICATING EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS:  A CROSS-NATIONAL APPROACH (forthcoming 2014).  
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have generated an upsurge in individual cases brought to the courts and 
tribunals.3 
In some countries, for instance the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and 
Italy, such individual employment rights cases go to the “ordinary” civil 
courts.  In the five countries covered here, however, there are specialized 
institutions for resolving individual employment rights disputes.  They are 
known generically as labor courts (although there are country specific 
names which we sometimes use).  Moreover, not only do these five 
countries have labor courts, but these courts have a mixed composition of 
professional judges and lay judges; the status and role of the latter are our 
focus.4  Thus, we do not cover other differences in these labor courts that do 
not relate to lay judges (for example, varying access arrangements such as 
the requirement for prehearing conciliation in Germany5 and France,6 the 
payment of court fees in Great Britain and France, or the often complex 
routes through quasi-judicial forums found in Ireland.7)  Here, we look 
solely at lay judges. 
We define lay judges as decision makers in a judicial process who are 
appointed through a range of procedures on the basis of their knowledge 
and experience of the world of employment, but who are not required to be 
legally qualified.  We mostly use the generic term “lay judge,” but 
sometimes we use the country specific title.  For example, in France lay 
judges are called prud’hommes (literally “good men”) or conseillers; in 
Germany they are called “ehrenamtliche Richter” (literally judges with 
posts “held in honor” rather than remunerated), while in Great Britain they 
are variously referred to as lay members, nonlegal members, or wing 
members.  All these terms have symbolic implications.  
Although there are considerable national differences in the historical 
routes through which lay judges have come to occupy these roles, one 
current rationale for the presence of lay judges in labor courts is that they 
contribute to the legitimacy of adjudication.  As we explore below, this has 
many facets.  While cross-country comparisons of the extent to which lay 
judges provide legitimacy are difficult, we argue that it is possible to offer 
 
 3. Research in the United Kingdom has found an association between falling union density and 
the greater use of litigation.  See, e.g., Simon Burgess et al., Explaining the Growth in the Number of 
Applications to Industrial Tribunals 1972–1997 (Emp. Rel. Res. Series 10, Dep’t Trade & Indus. 2000).  
 4. In some countries, such as New Zealand and South Africa, there are labor courts without lay 
judges, only a professional judge. 
 5. See PETER BADER ET AL., DIE EHRENAMTLICHEN RICHTERINNEN UND RICHTER IN DER 
ARBEITS-UND SOZIALGERICHTSBARKEIT [LAY JUDGES IN LABOR AND SOCIAL JURISDICITION] (13th ed. 
2012) (Ger.).  
 6. See DANIEL BOULMIER, CONSEIL DE PRUD’HOMMES [THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL] (2011) 
(Fr.). 
 7. See MAURICE CASHELL, A HISTORY OF THE RIGHTS COMMISSIONER SERVICE 1970–2010 
(Labor Relations Commission ed., 2011); Anthony Kerr & Cathal McGreal, Practice and Procedure in 
Employment Law, in EMPLOYMENT LAW (Maeve Regan ed., 2009). 
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some comparisons, albeit tentatively, and subject to the criteria adopted for 
defining legitimacy.  
Turning to the structure of this Article, having examined the rationale 
for lay judges and outlined our methodology, we provide a brief overview 
of labor court arrangements in the five countries covered.  Next, we 
consider three different aspects of legitimacy, drawing on the approach of 
Novitz and Syrpis.8  Finally, having discussed whether one can compare 
across countries, we make some concluding observations.  
II. THE RATIONALE FOR LAY JUDGES 
The use of lay judges in employment matters is not a new 
phenomenon.  In Britain, from the fourteenth century until the twentieth 
century, magistrates, who were often lay people, were responsible for 
enforcing employment contracts.9  Currently, when first instance federal 
courts in the United States hear employment discrimination cases, there is 
often a jury as well as a professional judge.  Such juries, drawn from the 
population, provide a diversity of viewpoints and a means of interjecting 
community norms into judicial proceedings.  Essentially, the judge and jury 
have separate roles.  The jury decides the facts and the professional judge 
sets out the relevant law.  This separation is reinforced by the fact that the 
jury retires separately without the professional judge.  
In many labor courts, there are lay judges, (often termed an industrial 
jury in Great Britain), but the structure is tripartite, literally “three parties.”  
The lay judges represent the two sides of industry:  employer and employee 
representatives, and they sit with a third party who is normally a legally 
qualified person.  Unlike the “ordinary” courts, in labor courts the lay 
judges and the legally qualified judge all retire together and all decide both 
fact and law. 
In Great Britain, lay judges sit with professional judges in some types 
of cases only and, where they do so, the overwhelming majority of 
decisions are unanimous.  For example, Selwyn said that 96% of decisions 
were unanimous, and a survey by Corby and Latreille in found that more 
than 70% of all British professional judges reported all their decisions had 
 
 8. Tonia Novitz & Phil Syrpis, Assessing Legitimate Structures for the Making of Transnational 
Labor Law:  The Durability of Corporatism, 35 IND. L.J. 367 (2006).  This adapts earlier work by 
Walker.  See Neil Walker, The White Paper in Constitutional Context (Working Paper No. 01/2001, 
2001), available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/5015354_The_White_Paper_in_Constitut 
ional_Context; Jean Monnet, Mountain or Molehill?  A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White 
Paper on Governance 33 (Working Paper No. 6/01, RSC, 2001), available at http://www.eui.eu/ 
Documents/RSCAS/Research/OnlineSymposia/Weiler.pdf.  
 9. DOUGLAS HAY & PAUL CRAVEN, MASTERS, SERVANTS AND MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN AND 
THE EMPIRE, 1562–955 (2004). 
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been unanimous in the previous year, with a further 21% recalling only a 
single majority decision.10 
In Sweden, 85% of all the labor court judgments were unanimous 
according to the Chief Judge in 2002, and the proportion of unanimous 
decisions has risen over the past decade.11  In Germany, dissents are not 
announced, but a similar degree of unanimity appears to exist.12  France has 
a bipartite system with employer and employee representatives, and a 
professional judge is brought in only to break a tie if they do not agree.  For 
much of the period from the early-1980s until 2001, the proportion of cases 
that resulted in a tie-break hearing varied between 10% and 14%, and from 
1988 to 1997 between 10% and 12%.  Since then, there has been a steady 
rise in this rate, and between 2007 and 2011 it was approximately 18–20% 
against a background of considerable regional variation.13  This increase has 
been attributed to changes in the type of cases, with more cases prompted 
by economic terminations that, in France, are seen as less amenable to 
bipartisan consensus.  
The fact that so many decisions are unanimous may make the 
decisions more acceptable to the parties than a split decision, but what is the 
explanation for this unanimity in the large majority of cases?  One 
explanation is that, despite the fact that all the judges are equal, in practice, 
the legally qualified judge dominates in tripartite labor courts.  The 
professional judge chairs the hearings and thus controls the proceedings, 
and hearings are held in a court concerned with the adjudication of 
increasingly complex legal entitlements set out in statute and interpreted in 
case law; this is a context to which legally qualified persons, unlike lay 
judges, are accustomed.  Furthermore, this view is supported by research 
outside the employment sphere; where lay judges sit with legally qualified 
judges, the former are marginalized, especially where the law is complex.14 
 
 10. NORMAN SELWYN, SELWYN’S LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 10 (15th ed. 2008).  Selwyn does not 
provide any source for the figure that he quotes.  Susan Corby & Paul L. Latreille, Survey Evidence:  ET 
and EAT Judges and Lay Members (2011), available at http://www2.gre.ac.uk/about/schools/business/ 
research/centres/weru/publications (last visited Dec. 16, 2013). 
 11. MICHAËL KOCH, REPORT TO TENTH MEETING OF EUROPEAN LABOUR COURT JUDGES 3 
(2002); Interview with Michaël Koch, Chief Judge of the Labor Court (Arbetsdomstolen), Stockholm, 
Sweden (Mar. 28, 2012).  
 12. BADER ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (noting a figure of 90% unanimity, as reported by judicial 
trainees for the bench, who attend labor court deliberations). 
 13. MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE [MINISTRY OF JUSTICE], Statistique judiciaries:  Activité des 
conseils de prud’hommes-Données détaillées—Cumul France entière, 1983–2011 [Judicial Statistics:  
Activity of Employment Tribunals—Detailed Breakdown, Cumulative, All-France 1983–2011], 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/statistiques.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).  
 14. See, e.g., Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Lay Participation in Decision Making:  A Croatian 
Perspective Mixed Tribunals, 36 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 406 (1997) (in respect of Croatian criminal 
appeals); Nick Wikely & Richard Young, The Marginalisation of Lay Members in Social Security 
Appeal Tribunals, 2 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 127 (1992) (in respect of British social security 
appeals).  
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Research pointing to professional judge domination outside the 
employment sphere does not necessarily translate to labor courts, but even 
were it to do so, it would not explain unanimity in France’s bipartite labor 
court, i.e., a court with lay judges only.  In France at the end of nineteenth 
century, “bourses du travail” attempted to impose a mandat impératif to 
oblige worker lay judges always to vote in favor of the worker by 
establishing a “committee of vigilance” to oversee lay judges from the 
workers’ side.  Hepple notes that this had the opposite effect and met with 
resistance from the judges.15  The mandat impératif was, in fact, prohibited 
in 1907.  Lay judges’ disinclination to accept a binding mandate may also 
have been tactical:  in 1905, scope had been introduced for a judge to rule in 
the event of a tie.  If worker-elected judges always voted for the employee’s 
cause, and the employer did the opposite, then this would have led to nearly 
all cases ultimately being taken out of the hands of the lay judges and 
decided by a professional judge.    
We submit that a more persuasive explanation is that, having secured 
their role through a procedure that legitimizes their status as representatives 
of their “side,” lay judges subsequently saw themselves as impartial and 
objective, and open to persuasion and argument during deliberations, in part 
to sustain and legitimate the existing bipartite structure.  French lay judges’ 
practice of compromise and a common interpretation of legal standards are 
not unique.  In Great Britain, for example, a senior judge commented on the 
fact that the lay judges approach their work objectively and judicially and 
not as partisan representatives of employer or employee as the case may 
be.16  In Germany, Höland noted:  “The vast majority of the professional 
judges, presiding [over] the chambers of the court, appreciate explicitly the 
expertise and the work life experience of the lay judges.”17 
 
 15. Bob Hepple, Labour Courts:  Some Comparative Perspectives, 41 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 
169, 182 (1988). 
 16. Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, The Role of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in the 1980s, 11 
INDUS. L.J. 69 (1982).  Although this comment applies to lay judges in Great Britain’s appellate labor 
court, (the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT)), there are no grounds for distinguishing between 
British lay judges at first and second instance, especially as many lay judges at the EAT were formerly 
lay judges at first instance.  
 17. Armin Höland, Fairness Control of Dismissals by Labour Courts—Legal conceptions and 
Practical Effects (July 2007), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1002&context=soceuro.  Höland draws on an empirical survey of labor court practice.  See also ARMIN 
HÖLAND ET AL., KÜNDIGUNGSPRAXIS UND KÜNDIGUNGSSCHUTZ IM ARBEITSVERHÄLTNIS [PROTECTION 
AND PRACTICE IN TERMINATING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP] 219 (2007) (Ger.), for full results of 
the survey of professional judges’ opinions about the role of lay judges.  A survey of lay judges’ views 
was not included in this study, in contrast to a preceding survey conducted in 1981, in which the 
unanimity of the court was attributed by the authors, in part, to passivity on the side of the lay members, 
although both professional judges and lay members gave a positive account of lay members’ 
contribution.  See JOSEF FALKE ET AL., KÜNDIGUNGSPRAXIS UND KÜNDIGUNGSSCHUTZ IN DER 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [DISMISSAL PRACTICE AND DISMISSAL PROTECTION IN THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] (1981) (Ger.).  
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In short, given that lay judges and professional judges have the same 
role in adjudicating fact and law, and given that a very large percentage of 
decisions are unanimous, the contribution of lay members cannot be 
discerned from considering the decisions themselves, i.e., the outcome.  So 
what do lay people add to decision making in employment cases?  There is 
some evidence to suggest that lay members contribute to the process.  In a 
survey in 2011 of professional and lay judges in Britain’s labor courts, 31% 
of legally qualified judges said they had “often” materially altered a lay 
judge’s initial views on liability, with 63% saying they had done so 
“sometimes.”  For their part, 12% of lay judges said they had “often” 
materially altered a professional judge’s initial views on liability, with 70% 
having done so “sometimes.”  Accordingly, the lay judges and the 
professional judge may often start from different positions, but after further 
scrutiny of the evidence before them, and further discussion and debate, in 
the vast majority of cases a unanimous decision is reached.  
This contribution to the decision making process relates to procedural 
justice.  The legitimacy of the way the decision is reached and the 2011 
survey mentioned above found that the majority of British professional 
judges (55%) and lay judges (98%) broadly agreed with the statement that 
“a three person tribunal is likely to have greater legitimacy for parties than a 
judge sitting alone.”18 
III. LEGITIMACY UNPICKED 
Legitimacy, however, is a complex concept, often intertwined with 
procedural justice.  The Oxford Thesaurus likens legitimacy to justice, 
fairness, credibility, and acceptability.19 
There are a number of conceptual frameworks for addressing the 
legitimacy of the decision-making process.  Theories of procedural justice 
focus primarily on perceptions of decision-making procedures from the 
standpoint of those affected by these decisions.  There is a body of research 
on citizens’ perceptions of the fairness of judicial processes in country-
specific or locality-specific situations.20  To date, however, we have not 
found comparative empirical research dealing specifically with judicial 
processes, but rather only of decision making, for instance, by managers.  
Such comparative research has used survey evidence, with some work 
exploring the relationship between perceptions of fairness and broader 
conceptualizations of national cultures, sometimes using simulations 
 
 18. See Corby & Latreille, supra  note 10, at 17. 
 19. LAWRENCE URDANG, THE OXFORD THESAURUS (1997). 
 20. For example, Tyler looked at perceptions of procedural justice in respect of the Chicago police 
and courts.  See Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice–Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the 
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & SOC. REV. 103 (1988). 
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instead of real events.21  This Article argues that lay judges in the 
employment sphere are not limited to providing legitimacy principally 
because, like virtually all the claimants and respondents, they are non-
lawyers.  They also provide legitimacy because they have expertise:  they 
enable adjudication to be carried out by persons with knowledge and 
experience of the workplace, and of employment more broadly, which the 
professional judge does not normally possess.  Research that included 
interviews with those representing claimants and respondents in Britain’s 
labor courts supports this view.  A typical comment was that at least there 
was someone there who could “appreciate things” from a workplace 
perspective.22  Accordingly, lay judges’ legitimacy draws on a concept not 
only of peer-based adjudication, but also adjudication by persons who have 
acquired expertise and gained tacit knowledge.  In this context, the 
distinctions developed by Novitz and Syrpis allow a more nuanced 
approach that can be productively applied to the employment adjudication 
context.  
Novitz and Syrpis consider legitimacy from the perspective of the 
making of transnational labor law.  They maintain that legitimacy has three 
inter-related aspects:  performance legitimacy, regime legitimacy, and 
polity legitimacy.23  This Article uses the typology of Novitz and Syrpis as 
an analytical framework for considering labor law adjudication.  We adopt 
this typology because we consider that it is a useful heuristic device that 
enables us to differentiate between a number of aspects of legitimacy, and 
in particular those pertaining both to the immediate situation and to wider 
contexts.  
According to Novitz and Syrpis, performance legitimacy “relates to 
the ability of any political entity to deliver policy goals”24:  efficiency-based 
arguments are decisive.  This, however, raises the question of how 
efficiency is to be operationalized and, in the context of this Article, how 
and by whom the contribution of lay judges is to be evaluated.  In our 
context, performance legitimacy might be held to be a function of the extent 
to which lay judges’ workplace experience is utilized, the development of 
their expertise and its application in an adjudicative process.  Performance 
legitimacy is, in principle, ascertainable, and possibly measurable, by 
looking at outputs.  Effective and “good” decisions can be accepted by the 
parties; “poor” decisions, in which expertise has not been brought to bear, 
 
 21. Joel Brockner et al., Culture and Procedural Justice:  The Influence of Power Distance on 
Reactions to Voice, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 300 (2001).  
 22. Susan Corby & Paul L. Latreille, Interviews with Stakeholders (2011), available at 
http://www2.gre.ac.uk/about/schools/business/research/centres/weru/publications. 
 23. See Monnet, supra note 8; Walker, supra note 8.  
 24. Novitz & Syrpis, supra  note 8, at 369. 
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can be rejected, either through avoidance of the system (cases not brought 
to labor courts) or through high levels of appeals.  
Regime legitimacy for Novitz and Syrpis refers to the nature of the 
organizational structure and the representative capacity and accountability 
of participants.  Applied to the employment context, one yardstick would be 
ease of access to the system and speed of decision making, issues that we 
do not deal with here (but which might be relevant to attraction 
to/avoidance of the system).  A further aspect is that of transparent selection 
and the representativeness, in a broad sense, of lay judges.  Transparent 
selection would underpin acceptance that methods for choosing lay judges 
were readily understandable and understood and accepted by participants.  
The issue of representativeness and accountability is a complex one.  For 
example, should lay judges be representative of and accountable to the 
parties who nominate them (often organizations that embrace only a 
minority of the working population and of employers), and how does this 
relate to the extent that they reflect the wider population (in terms of 
interests, attitudes, and demographic characteristics)?  While there may be 
an aspiration for the body of professional judges to be more socially 
diverse, this is not a defining characteristic of an ability to apply the law.  
However, if one aspect of the regime legitimacy of lay judges is their 
representativeness, as well as their expertise, then this could be relevant in 
an evaluation of their legitimacy.  
Finally, polity legitimacy, for Novitz and Syrpis, is an umbrella term 
that relates to the extent to which an entity “meets certain minimum 
conditions of political community.”25  Applied to labor courts, one 
yardstick might be the extent to which labor courts with lay judges echo the 
social or economic arrangements in the country concerned.  This is a much 
more difficult notion to operationalize, given that it is highly diffuse, by its 
nature relativistic and, in view of the political and industrial relations 
background of most polities, contested.  At the same time, it is also likely to 
be an extremely significant variable, as it embodies deeply held cultural 
assumptions about what is appropriate and inappropriate.26 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
Before considering our findings, we outline our methodology.  The 
five countries studied are all in Western Europe, all are members of the 
European Union and are thus subject to E.U. employment legislation, and 
all have labor courts with lay judges.  These countries exhibit different 
 
 25. See id. 
 26. These perhaps become more evident when major institutional change is proposed or 
implemented.  
BURGESS ET AL 35-2 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2014  2:23 PM 
2014] LAY JUDGES AND LABOR COURTS 199 
approaches toward lay judges’ selection, training, and deployment and 
indeed represent different European models:  Nordic (Sweden), Continental 
(Germany), Latin (France), and Anglophone (Great Britain and Ireland).  
They do not, however, represent an exhaustive list of countries that have 
labor courts with lay judges.27  
This study of labor courts is primarily based on desk research drawing 
on official materials, statutes, handbooks, and legal commentaries in 
English, French, and German.  In addition, face-to-face interviews with six 
stakeholders were held in Ireland (heads of the main judicial bodies, 
members, public officials, and an employer representative); ten stakeholders 
in Sweden (professional and lay judges, lawyers, and public officials) and 
in Germany, face-to-face interviews were conducted with three Federal 
Labor Court judges.  In Great Britain, one of the authors has extensive 
experience as both a participant (lay judge) and observer of its first instance 
and second instance labor courts.  The interview material was mainly used 
to elucidate and clarify institutional practice in order to allow for 
institutional comparison, which is the main focus in this Article.  Further 
research is needed on the practice of key actors.  
V. LAY JUDGES IN LABOR COURTS 
A. Constitution 
All the countries examined here divide lay judges into an employee 
and employer side and such lay judges provide a workplace perspective that 
can be distinguished from the legal perspective of the professional judge.  
This aside, there are substantial differences in how first instance labor 
courts are constituted.  Germany’s are tripartite, i.e., a legally qualified 
judge and equal numbers of employer and employee lay judges, as is 
Ireland’s Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) that, paradoxically, is 
mainly a first instance labor court.28 
In Sweden, unusually, the tripartite labor courts include a labor market 
expert as well as professional judges as their independent third party, plus 
as in other countries in this Article, equal numbers of employer and 
employee lay judges.  Unusually, also in Sweden, only labor market actors, 
which are trade unions and employers’ associations/employers who are 
 
 27. For example, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Luxembourg all have labor courts with lay 
judges, as do some ex-Soviet countries, such as Slovenia.  
 28. Other first instance complaints may be adjudicated by a single nonlegally qualified adjudicator, 
a Rights Commissioner, or the Equality Tribunal.  Ireland, however, is on the cusp of radical change.  
The EAT is set to be abolished and all adjudication at first instance would be by a single, nonlegally 
qualified adjudicator with appeals de novo to a tripartite labor court.  See RICHARD BRUTON, BLUEPRINT 
TO DELIVER A WORLD-CLASS WORKPLACE RELATIONS SERVICE (2012). 
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party to a collective agreement, and the Discrimination Ombudsman (where 
it is an employment matter) have access to the labor court.29  Swedish 
workers not supported by a labor market actor have to go to the district 
court.  
In Great Britain, the labor court (employment tribunal) deals with most 
labor issues,30 but only some of them are heard on a tripartite basis.  Over 
the past two decades, the government has been whittling away the role of 
lay judges by requiring an increasing number of types of complaint to be 
heard by the professional judge alone.  Although the professional judge has 
discretion to opt for a tripartite labor court subject to certain statutory 
criteria, in practice the professional judge now sits with lay judges only 
essentially in discrimination cases.31  Finally, in France, as noted above, 
cases are heard in first-instance labor courts by equal numbers of employer 
and employee members (prud’hommes) without a professional judge:  a 
bipartite system.  A professional judge is only brought in as a tiebreaker if 
an agreement cannot be reached.  
Figure 1:  Adjudication in First Instance Labor Courts32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With regard to appeals, Sweden’s Labor Court is the first and the only 
court for cases that begin there, as there is no appeal from it on any ground.  
If a case begins in the civil court, which as noted above occurs where a 
claimant is not supported by a labor market actor, then appeal is to the 
Labor Court, giving the lay judges nominated by the social partners a key 
role in determining the eventual outcome.  
 
 29. In Sweden, many employment rights, including working hours, are set out in collective 
agreements, whereas in Great Britain, for instance, there is legislation. 
 30. Essentially, in Great Britain, contract issues and personal injury claims are heard by the 
“ordinary” civil courts. 
 31. As an illustration of the dimension of “polity legitimacy,” some of our interviewees for this 
study in Germany were astounded that the professional judge, not the legislature, could decide the 
composition of the labor court.  
 32. In Great Britain, the default position is that some types of complaint are heard by the labor 
court constituted on a unipartite basis, while some types of complaints (essentially discrimination 
complaints) are heard in the labor court constituted on a tripartite basis.  In Ireland, complaints relating 
to the same set of circumstances are heard in different adjudicative bodies, some constituted on a 
unipartite basis and one constituted on a tripartite basis.  
Great 
Britain 
Ireland 
Great 
Britain 
Ireland 
Sweden 
Germany 
 
France 
Unipartite Bipartite Tripartite 
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Germany also has an autonomous employment adjudication system.  It 
is tripartite at every level:  after a first instance decision by the tripartite 
local labor court, an appeal can be made to the relevant regional (Land) 
court on fact and law in a range of prescribed circumstances, including if 
the sum at issue exceeds a certain amount (€600 at the time of writing); if 
the issue centers on termination; or if the first instance court is of the view 
that the case is “of fundamental significance.”  A further appeal, on a point 
of law only, can be made to the tripartite Federal Labor Court.33 
In Great Britain, appeals on a point of law go from the first instance 
labor court to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) where from 2013 
the default position is unipartite, a professional judge alone.34  After this 
first level of appeal, further appeals can be made on points of law to the 
Court of Appeal35 and the Supreme Court, but these are “ordinary” 
appellate courts staffed exclusively by professional judges.  
In France, an appeal can be made de novo if the amount at issue 
exceeds €4,000 (taking each claim separately, not the aggregate).  The 
appeal is to the social chamber of the court of appeal, which is staffed only 
by professional judges.  A further appeal on a point of law can be made to 
court of cassation, a general court also only staffed by professional 
judges.36 
Ireland has a complex system, not only at first instance, but also for 
appeals.  In the main, appeals on individual rights disputes ultimately go to 
the “ordinary” courts, where professional judges sit without lay judges.  
Thus, appeals from the first instance labor court (EAT) go to the Circuit 
Court on fact and law under the unfair dismissal and maternity protection 
legislation.  Ireland, however, has another appellate body:  the Labor Court.  
The Labor Court is tripartite, but the independent member is not required to 
be legally qualified.  As well as hearing collective issues at first instance, it 
provides the first level of appeal from decisions of a Rights Commissioner 
or the Equality Tribunal.  Further appeals from the Labor Court go to the 
High Court on a point of law.37 
 
 33. See R. DENDORFER, DAS ABEITSGERICHTSVERFAHREN [THE LABOR COURT PROCEDURE] 67, 
77 (2011) (Ger.).  
 34. Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24 (Eng.).  Previously, where there was 
tripartite composition at the first instance labor court, there was tripartite composition at the EAT. 
 35. Three of the Court of Appeal judges at the time of writing were formerly presidents of the EAT 
and are often, but not always, one of the three judges sitting on an employment case. 
 36. MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES, DU TRAVAIL ET DE LA SOLIDARITÉ, [MINISTRY OF 
LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS], Le Conseil de Prud’hommes [The Employment Tribunal] 94 (2002) (Fr.).   
 37. CORBY & BURGESS, supra  note 2. 
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B. Regime Legitimacy 
1. The Role of Worker and Employer Organizations 
After this brief overview, we now return to our central concern:  the 
legitimacy provided by lay judges, dealing first with regime legitimacy, 
which relates to transparent selection, representativeness, and 
accountability.  
Direct nomination by trade unions and employer associations remains 
the norm outside of Great Britain, although the extent to which the state has 
an over-riding voice varies.  In Ireland, public officials automatically accept 
nominations from a wide variety of labor market participants for Ireland’s 
first instance tripartite labor court, confusingly called the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (EAT).  In France, public officials also automatically 
accept those lay judges put forward by worker and employer organizations, 
of which there is a wide range, but these lay judges have only been put 
forward by the worker and employer organizations after all-member 
elections in which trade unions compete against each other, as do the 
employer organizations.  Elections are held every five years by a complex 
system of proportional representation based on a list system.38 
In Germany, the final decision on appointment to labor courts is made 
by public officials.  Organizations may compete, principally on the 
employee side, as no particular employee organization has an institutional 
privilege, provided it meets certain statutory criteria, but also there are 
criteria relating to the characteristics of nominees.  If there are more 
nominations than places, public officials from the Labor and Justice 
Ministries in Land governments then scrutinize the nominating 
organizations, considering, for instance, number of members and collective 
bargaining activity (number of agreements).  Officials are not bound by the 
original lists provided by each organization and may ask for more 
nominations, for example, to ensure that minorities and/or the social and 
economic structure of the district are appropriately reflected in the 
composition of the court.  This includes an appropriate balance of different 
employees (skilled, unskilled, white-collar) and employer (large, small) 
 
 38. JACKY RICHARD & ALEXANDRE PASCAL, POUR LE RENFORCEMENT DE LA LÉGITIMITÉ DE 
L’INSTITUTION PRUD’HOMALE:  QUELLE FORME DE DÉSIGNATION DES CONSEILLERS PRUD’HOMMES? 
[STRENGTHENING THE LEGITIMACY OF LAY PARTICIPATION:  HOW SHOULD LAY JUDGES BE 
APPOINTED?]  (Rapport au Ministre du Travail, de la Solidarité et de la Fonction Publique, 2010), 
available at http://www.travail-emploi-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/VF_rapport_200510__2_.pdf (Fr.) The 
elections are a test of the relative strength of the trade unions each of whom encourage their members to 
vote for their slate. 
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types.  As a rule, however, public officials appoint in order of the lists from 
nominating organizations without further ado.39 
In Sweden, worker and employer organizations do not compete.  There 
are entitlements laid down in statute.  Sweden’s labor court, in addition to 
the professional judges and the labor market experts, has a panel of seven 
trade union side members and seven employer side members.40  The union 
panel comprises four lay judges drawn from the main trade union 
confederation (LO), two from the professional employees’ confederation 
(TCO), and one from the professional associations’ confederation (SACO).  
The employer panel comprises four drawn from the main employers’ 
confederation (SN), one each from the associations for local authorities and 
for county councils, and one to represent the state as employer.41  In 
addition, each judge has three stand-ins or deputies.  All these social partner 
organizations “recommend” to the employment ministry, but in practice the 
“recommendations” are accepted.  
Unlike the other countries covered in this Article, Britain’s social 
partners have not played a part in the selection of lay judges to Great 
Britain’s labor courts for over a decade.  Since 1999, lay judges have 
nominated themselves to the employee or employer panel.42  This is not to 
say that self-nomination does not take place outside Great Britain, but it is 
typically behind an institutional veil, through internal search or self-
promotion, and individuals do not submit applications directly to appointing 
authorities.  Also in Great Britain, self nominees are assessed by formal 
selection processes which draw on a conventional human resources 
repertoire (competency frameworks, job requirements, formal interviews) 
overseen by the Judicial Appointments Commission; there is virtually no 
involvement of the social partners in this selection, which is conducted by 
human resources consultants assisted by professional judges.43 
Great Britain’s system for the selection of lay judges has no 
institutional parallel in other countries with lay judges.  In France, 
Germany, Ireland, and Sweden, the institutional bearers of expertise, the 
worker and employer organizations, assess potential lay judges either 
informally or formally through proxy indicators such as employment 
 
 39. See BADER ET AL., supra  note 5, at 38.  The existence of multiple unions derives from German 
constitutional provisions on the freedom of association. 
 40. ARBETSDOMSTOLEN [LABOR COURT], Välkommen till Arbetsdomstolens hemsida 
[Presentation of the Swedish Labor Court] , http://www.arbetsdomstolen.se (last visited Dec. 16, 2013) 
(Swed.).  
 41. Id. 
 42. This has sometimes proved problematic where managers who are also union members 
nominate themselves to the employee panel.  See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, 
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS:  LAY MEMBER RECRUITMENT EXERCISE 2002:  EVALUATION SUMMARY 
(2003).  
 43. See id. 
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relations experience.  Somewhat paradoxically, however, although in Great 
Britain worker and employer organizations do not play a part in the 
nomination and selection of lay judges, tripartism has not been totally 
obliterated:  the final stage is appointment by the Minister, who only 
appoints after consulting with organizations representative of employers 
and employees, although in practice this is a formality.44  There is no such 
consultation, however, when British lay judges are reappointed after their 
three-year term, a reappointment that is virtually automatic until the age of 
seventy. 
The extent to which worker and employer organizations have a key 
role in the selection and appointment of lay members is one aspect of 
regime legitimacy, although one that is open to challenge should these 
systems be seen to be vulnerable to “insiderism,” where strong 
organizations gain institutional privileges.  Another aspect is accountability.  
In none of the countries reviewed here, however, is there any identifiable 
attempt by nominating or electing employer/union bodies either to suggest 
an approach to those who “represent” them, or to obtain feedback from 
them.  In fact, evidence from France, for example, suggests that lay judges 
are very concerned to assert their independence from their organizational 
roots and act as judges, not representatives.45  
2. The Wider Population 
One criterion for regime legitimacy might be deemed the extent to 
which lay judges are representative of the worker and employer 
organizations.  Another is the extent to which they represent the wider 
population, for instance, in respect of gender and ethnicity.  
In Germany, legislation regulating all types of courts states that 
women and men must be “appropriately represented,” but there is 
disagreement amongst commentators, as well as differing Land level 
legislation, on how this should be interpreted.  Bader et al., for example, 
note that to reflect the proportion of women in the workforce, 45% would 
be appropriate.46  The proportion of female lay judges in North-Rhine 
Westphalia in 2012 was 24%47 and, as noted above, public officials 
 
 44. Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations, 2004, S.I. 
2004/1861, reg. 8 (Gr. Brit.). 
 45. See, e.g., Boulmier, supra note 6, at 205.  
 46. See BADER ET AL., supra  note 5, at 42. 
 47. NRW Justiz in Zahlen: Ehrenamtliche Richterinnen und Richter [Justice in Figure: Lay Judges], 
http://www.jm.nrw.de/Gerichte_Behoerden/zahlen_fakten/statistiken/Ehrenamtliche_Richter.pdf (2012); 
see also BADER ET AL., supra  note 5 (discussing the proportion of women in the workforce). 
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virtually never reject worker and employer organizations’ nominations in 
practice on any grounds, including diversity.48 
In France, organizations putting forward lists for election must seek to 
achieve an improved gender balance by reducing the gap between the 
proportion of women elected and their proportion of the relevant electorate.  
The proportion of women lay judges has risen considerably recently, and 
28.4% of all conseillers were women in 2008, although this is still less than 
the proportion of women working in France.49  By section, the proportion 
ranged from 21.5% in industry to 38.1% in “miscellaneous activities.”50 
In Great Britain, not only gender but also ethnicity are considered 
specifically in the recruitment of lay judges.  The Judicial Appointments 
Commission (JAC) is enjoined to widen the membership of the judiciary in 
terms of diversity; statistics are noted and tests for admission as a lay judge 
are checked for disparate impact.51  A survey conducted in 2011 found that 
44% of Britain’s lay judges were female and 6% were from black or 
minority ethnic (BME) groups, approaching a reflection of the gender and 
ethnicity of the wider working population.52  It is worth noting that the 
increase in women and BME persons as lay judges dates back to 1999 when 
self-nomination superseded nomination by worker and employer 
organizations, suggesting that social representativeness appears to be at 
odds with institutional nomination/appointment.  
As to the nature of employment in the relevant area, this is a 
consideration in Germany only where public officials can in theory (but do 
not in practice) reject nominations of employer and worker lay judges if 
they do not reflect the social and economic structure of the locality.  
 
 48. Interview undertaken as part of ESRC RES-000-22-4154.  Interview with three German 
Federal Labor Court judges together—a professional judge, a worker lay judge, and an employer lay 
judge, Erfurt, Germany (July 15, 2011) (names redacted as promised before interview).  
 49. Report on Equality Between Women and Men 2010, COM (2009) 694 final (Dec. 2009), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4613&langId=en. 
 50. MINISTÈRE DU TRAVAIL, DES RELATIONS SOCIALES, DE LA FAMILLE, DE LA SOLIDARITÉ ET DE 
LA VILLE. Chiffres-clés de l’égalite entre les femmes et les hommes, 2009 [Key Data on Equality 
Between Men and Women, 2009] , at 15 (Ministère du Travail, des Relations Sociales, de la Famille, de 
la Solidarité et de la Ville, 2010) (Fr.).  
 51. The government’s focus on diversity is illustrated by the establishment of the Advisory Panel 
on Judicial Diversity in 2009 chaired by Baroness Neuberger and the subsequent formation of a Judicial 
Diversity Taskforce to take forward its recommendations. 
 52. Corby & Latreille, supra note 18.  For the latest statistics on the gender and ethnic composition 
of Great Britain’s labor force, see U.K. NATIONAL STATISTICS, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/ 
hub/index.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).   
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C. Performance Legitimacy 
1. Workplace Experience 
Performance legitimacy relates to some measure of effective output, 
and we have already noted that lay judges inject an employment relations 
and workplace perspective, often of a complex and tacit kind, 
complementing the legal perspective of the judge.  Such a workplace 
perspective arguably helps ensure that legal decisions take account of 
context, and thus lay judges add to the performance legitimacy of labor 
courts by enabling “better”—that is, more well-founded decisions—to be 
made.  Associated with this, it is also arguable that, given the knowledge 
that lay judges are meant to bring to bear, their performance legitimacy (as 
well as, possibly, regime legitimacy) would be enhanced the more closely 
their workplace experience mirrors that of the disputing parties, and a 
number of systems of labor jurisdiction make formal provision for just this.  
In practice, there is spectrum ranging from countries with a sector-based 
chamber system, as in France, to Great Britain, where precise matching has 
been discouraged.  
In France, the bipartite labor courts comprise lay judges who are 
elected by the two sides of industry in five autonomous sections:  industry, 
commerce and private services, agriculture, managers, and a general 
section.  The labor courts are organized territorially and “to ensure that best 
account is taken of social and economic realities,” each of the 210 labor 
courts are divided into the same five occupational sections that were used in 
the electoral process and the lay judges then sit in the appropriate section.53  
In general, this form of matching is a good deal weaker than it might 
appear:  the categories are very broad and many cases go to the “general” 
chamber.  One of the functions of the chamber system is simply to break 
down caseloads into manageable proportions, albeit on a sectoral basis 
rather than simply allocation by geography.  
Germany’s first instance labor courts, also organized territorially, may 
establish specialist chambers (Fachkammer) to match lay judge expertise to 
the workplace of the parties.  However, in practice this happens in only a 
few courts in the largest towns (principally Berlin) for either an 
industry/sector such as the public sector and construction, or for specific 
occupational groups, such as technical staff.  In Ireland’s EAT, there is no 
formal chamber system, but some matching between lay judges’ knowledge 
 
 53. MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES, supra  note 36. 
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and a case may be undertaken informally by the listings officer.54  In 
Sweden’s labor court, matching takes place in certain circumstances:  if the 
case concerns the application of a collective agreement, the 
employer/employee members are chosen from the sector of the labor market 
in which the dispute arises, conflicts of interest apart.55 
In Britain’s labor courts, as noted above, the matching of the lay 
judge’s workplace experience to the parties’ type of workplace is 
discouraged.  Over forty years ago, the Royal Commission recommended 
that “the lay judges sitting in a case are, if possible, not connected with the 
industry in which the dispute has arisen.”56  More recently, a labor court 
hearing a case of sex discrimination in a police authority included a lay 
judge selected because he was an equal opportunities adviser employed in 
another police authority.  The appellate court ruled, however, that was 
undesirable as lay judges might be informed more by their own knowledge 
than by the facts and evidence relevant to the particular case.57 
2. Training and Appraisal 
Another aspect of performance legitimacy is the extent to which lay 
judges receive training, since it can be argued that training contributes to 
lay judges’ effectiveness in the decision making process and thus raises the 
performance legitimacy of the bodies on which they sit.  Of course, this 
depends on the quality of training and whether training actually improves 
performance, an issue that could be gauged by an appraisal of courtroom 
behavior and judge-craft.58 
Bearing in mind these caveats, there is no simple correlation between 
the provision of training and support for lay judges and the approach to 
nomination and appointment.  The more individualistic British system, 
where lay judges self-nominate, shifts the onus for training to the state, 
which pays lay judges who attend the training, such training being normally 
provided by the professional judges.  This is also essentially the position in 
France, where lay judges are put forward by worker and employer 
organizations after election by their members.  Training is financed by the 
state and carried out by an authorized organization.  In Ireland, which is 
 
 54. Interview with the following three people together: Kate O’Mahony (Chair, Employment 
Appeals Tribunal), Peter O’Leary (Vice-Chair, Employment Appeals Tribunal), David Small (Secretary, 
Employment Appeals Tribunal), Dublin, June 28, 2011. 
 55. In Sweden, many matters that are statutorily regulated in other countries, such as working time 
and a minimum wage, are regulated by collective agreements. 
 56. ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS, 1865–1968 
(CHAIRMAN LORD DONOVAN) REPORT, PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT, at 158 (June 1968). 
 57. Halford v. Sharples & Ors, [1992] I.C.R. 146 (Gr. Brit.). 
 58. In Great Britain, there is a formal system for a regional judge to appraise and observe 
professional judges in the courtroom, but there is no formal system in respect of the lay judges. 
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also characterized by social partner nominations, training for EAT members 
is provided by the EAT itself and members may also receive some support 
from their nominating organizations.  
In Germany, where trade union and employer bodies nominate lay 
judges, there is no general statutory obligation on the state to provide 
preparatory or ongoing training for lay judges, nor any custom and practice.  
As a rule, trade unions and employer associations provide training, with 
some financial support from Land governments.  The usual amount appears 
to be 75% of the training costs, but this varies from region to region.59  
Employees who are lay judges have an entitlement to reasonable, and 
usually paid, time off for training conducted by trade unions, while the 
German association for labor court judges holds events and circulates 
information.  In Sweden, according to the former Chair of the Labor Court, 
“no training of law and procedure is given to lay judges.  It is up to the 
professional judges, primarily the chairman, to explain matters of law and 
procedure,”60 although many of the lay judges, particularly on the union 
side, are legally trained.61 
As to appraisal, there is no system of appraisal of the lay members in 
any of the countries studied by the professional judges or by the nominating 
or appointing bodies.  
D. Polity Legitimacy 
Polity legitimacy is the most general of the categories used by Novitz 
and Syrpis.  It provides for a consideration not only of the institutions’ 
members, but also the context in which they are embedded.  A polity enjoys 
legitimacy to the extent that “its putative members treat it as a significant 
point of reference within their political identity.”62  Applied here, this 
“reference” might be seen in the extent to which the labor court’s 
composition reflects that country’s broader social and economic context, 
and is therefore consonant with the values and perceptions of employees 
and industrial relations actors.  As such, the substance of polity legitimacy 
could vary substantially between different national systems and, potentially, 
as between actors within the same system.  Polity legitimacy is, therefore, a 
contested concept.  Evidence to attempt to ascertain it would have to 
consider both support for the system, as well as responses to proposals for 
change or challenges, and the origins of adjudication systems.  Of necessity, 
these issues can be addressed only briefly in the context of this Article.  
 
 59. BADER ET AL., supra  note 5, at 115. 
 60. KOCH, supra note 11. 
 61. Interview with Koch supra note 11 and interview with Margareta Zanden, worker lay judge, 
Stockholm, Sweden (Mar. 30, 2012).  
 62. See Novitz & Syrpis, supra note 8; Walker, supra  note 8. 
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One approach is to consider the industrial relations context.  Does the 
nomination/election of lay judges through union and employer 
organizations in France, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden reflect the fact that 
those countries have a higher organizational density than Great Britain, 
where lay judges self-nominate?  The short answer is “no.”  Of the 
countries considered here, only Sweden has a higher union density than 
Great Britain.  Accordingly, at first sight a labor court constituted with 
employer and employee members nominated by the worker and employer 
organizations seems anomalous in many countries.  For example, in France, 
union density is less than 8%63 and the issue of representativeness in France 
has surfaced from time to time around debates over the legitimacy of lay 
judges elected via trade unions.64  Turning, however, to industrial relations 
arrangements more broadly, there is an association between the degree of 
embeddedness of collective institutions (including for workplace 
representation, the significance of collective agreements, either direct or via 
extension), tripartite bodies, and the presence of employer and employee 
nominees on bodies that resolve individual employment rights disputes.  
For example, Germany, Ireland, France, and Sweden have a greater density 
of tripartite (and in France also some bipartite) arrangements in other areas 
of employment and social regulation and governance, albeit with major 
differences between them.65  This perspective would, however, still require 
that these arrangements are broadly supported and seen as reflective of 
“encompassing” institutions, to borrow Olson’s term,66 and not viewed as 
capture by insiders. 
Another approach to polity legitimacy and conceptualizing the 
country’s social and economic framework is the “varieties of capitalism” 
theory.  Although space precludes a full discussion, this theory essentially 
posits that there are “complementarities” between firms’ strategic choices, 
industrial relations arrangements, vocational training, corporate governance, 
and employer and employee associations with two broad economic models.  
In coordinated market economies, coordination problems between 
economic actors are resolved by non-market methods, while in liberal 
 
 63. Union density figures for the countries covered here are taken from OECD, Trade Union 
Density, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).  
 64. Laurent Willemez, Le sens d’une élection et les frontières de la justice:  Les controverses 
autour des élections prud’homale [The Logic of an Election and the Frontiers of Justice:  Controversies 
over Elections for Lay Judge Positions in Employment Tribunals] , in HÉLÈNE MICHEL & LAURENT 
WILLEMEZ, LA JUSTICE AU RISQUE DES PROFANES [JUSTICE AT RISK FROM THE LAYPERSON] 15–30 
(2007) (Fr.).  
 65. Marian Schaapman & Robbert van het Kaar, EIRO, Social Partners and Social Security 
Systems, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/09/study/tn0509103s.html (last updated Feb. 20, 
2007).  
 66. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS:  ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, 
AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 47 (1982). 
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market economies these problems are resolved through competitive and 
contract-based inter-firm relations.67 
Arguably, the current self-nomination of nonlegal members in Great 
Britain is consonant with its liberal market economy and weakened 
collectivism, as is the fact that in many cases professional judges sit alone 
without employer/employee lay judges.  Similarly, Germany’s and 
Sweden’s tripartism display “organizational fit” with their coordinated 
market economies as worker and employer organizations have important 
roles in the selection and nomination of lay judges, who adjudicate on 
virtually all except procedural matters.  Ireland, however, does not fit this 
typology easily.  First, it has tripartite employment rights adjudicative 
institutions, with nominations by worker and employer organizations.  
Second, although it has concluded a series of national social partnership 
agreements lasting approximately three years in duration (the last one being 
the Transitional Agreement concluded in late 2008), it is generally 
classified as a liberal market economy.68 
Interestingly, only in Great Britain, a liberal market economy, has the 
presence of lay judges in labor courts been radically reduced by 
government.  In France there have been questions about lay judges, but they 
have been directed mainly at the selection mechanisms for lay judges, not at 
their role.  Prompted by the low turnout in elections for lay judges (26% on 
the union side and 31% on the employer side), a government commissioned 
report has proposed options for changes to the electoral system:  
simplifying the voting procedure by abolishing voting by section; 
appointing trade union side lay judges according to the representativeness 
of the unions; or electing lay judges from an electoral college.69 
In Germany, a coordinated market economy, such questioning of the 
virtues of having lay judges, particularly on the Federal Labor Court, has 
been voiced only tentatively by the main employers’ association, the BDA.  
Even then, the BDA has not held to an entirely consistent position over the 
 
 67. The classic exposition is the Introduction, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM (Peter A. Hall & 
David Soskice eds., 2001); see also BEYOND VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM:  CONFLICT, CONTRADICTIONS, 
AND COMPLEMENTARITIES IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY (Bob Hancké, Martin Rhones & Mark Thatcher 
eds., 2007) (offering critiques and refinements); DEBATING VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM:  A READER (Bob 
Hancké ed., 2009). 
 68. See TIM HASTINGS, BRIAN SHEEHAN & PADRAIG YEATES, SAVING THE FUTURE:  HOW SOCIAL 
PARTNERSHIP SHAPED IRELAND’S ECONOMIC SUCCESS (2007); Ferdinand Von Prondzynski, Ireland:  
Between Centralization and the Market (1992), in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE 
(Anthony Ferner & Richard Hyman eds., 2009); William K. Roche & Paul Teague, Firms and 
Innovative Conflict Management Systems in Ireland, 49 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 436 (2011); Ireland:  
Industrial Relations Profile (Queen’s University Management School Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper No: MS_WPS_MAN_09_7, Eurofound, 2013), available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ 
eiro/country/ireland.pdf.  
 69. RICHARD & PASCAL, supra  note 38. 
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years, despite its central role in the system.70  On the one hand, in the past 
the BDA has argued for the merging of social and labor courts into a single 
jurisdiction (possibly even extending to full merger of all the civil courts, 
which would effectively eliminate lay judges).  On the other hand, it 
currently supports the retention of separate courts with a tripartite 
composition at all levels, possibly reflecting the recrudescence of social 
partnership in more recent years.71  Moreover, a proposal made by some 
jurists in the mid-2000s to convert appellate courts into professional judge-
only bodies garnered little support and was dropped by Land justice 
ministers.  Accordingly, German labor courts remain autonomous and 
tripartite at all levels.  
In Sweden, there was some discussion about whether the labor court, 
normally constituted to hear each case with seven members (two 
professional judges, one labor market expert and two lay judges drawn from 
unions and two lay judges drawn from employers), was the appropriate 
forum for employment discrimination issues.  This was because some 
female members of parliament felt that the four social partner judges in the 
labor court, who could outvote the three neutrals, might have an interest in 
preserving the status quo and thus the perpetuation of male advantage in the 
workplace.  It was then agreed that while employment discrimination issues 
would continue to be heard in the labor court, it could be composed of only 
one union side lay judge and only one employer side lay judge, plus the 
three neutrals (the two professional judges and the labor market expert) so 
that the neutrals could not be outvoted.72 
A further approach to conceptualizing the country’s social and 
economic framework for polity legitimacy purposes is to consider the legal 
context and whether the bedrock is one of the principal legal families:  the 
civil law tradition (with French, German, and Nordic variants) and the 
English common law tradition.73  Again, Ireland does not fit this typology.  
It is a common law country, but the composition of its tripartite courts has 
not been altered.  Thus, it can be distinguished from Great Britain, the other 
 
 70. See SANDRA SAWALL, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER ARBEITSGERICHTSBARKEIT [THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR JURISDICTION] (2007) (Ger.). 
 71. Interview with Herr Roland Wolf, Head of Department for Employment and Collective 
Bargaining Law, Bundesverband deutscher Arbeitgeberverbande (BDA), Berlin (Apr, 26, 2013).  This is 
also evidenced by a joint proposal in 2011 from the national trade union confederation and the BDA to 
stabilize aspects of the collective bargaining system through statutory means.  
 72. Interview with Gunilla Upmark, Labor Market Expert on the Arbetsdomstolen and 
Parliamentary Adviser (Mar. 28, 2012).  This composition in discrimination cases is permissive, not 
mandatory.  
 73. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir 
trans., 3d ed. 1997); Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias M. Siems, The Evolution of Labour Law:  
Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes, 146 INT’L LAB. REV. 133, 133 (2007). 
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common law country here, where tripartism in the latter’s adjudicative 
institutions has been significantly attenuated.  
E. Discussion 
To summarize our empirical data, labor court decisions in the main are 
unanimous in all the countries covered here, irrespective of how lay judges 
are selected, trained, and deployed.  In France, lay judges are elected and a 
professional judge is only brought in at first instance when the lay judges 
disagree.  In Sweden, access to the Labor Court is limited to employers, 
unions, and the discrimination ombudsman.  Ireland uniquely has a 
complex system of employment rights adjudication, and in one appellate 
tripartite forum even the independent member is not required to be legally 
qualified.  Germany is unique in that it has an autonomous, tripartite labor 
court system up to the highest level.  Lastly, Great Britain has very many 
characteristics that distinguish it from all its neighbors:  lay judges self-
nominate, with the worker and employer organizations neither nominating, 
electing, nor selecting them; lay judge applications are assessed by a third 
party (not the worker and employer organizations) applying conventional 
human resources techniques, and most importantly, government has step by 
step reduced the range of cases on which lay judges adjudicate.  
We have argued that although there is a high level of unanimity in 
outcomes, the main contribution of lay judges is to provide legitimacy to 
the decision making process.  We also sought to break down the notion of 
legitimacy, using the conceptual schema suggested by Novitz and Syrpis.  
Accordingly, we have divided legitimacy into performance legitimacy, 
regime legitimacy, and polity legitimacy.  Can one argue, however, that the 
presence of lay judges in labor courts in some countries generates more 
legitimacy than in other countries? 
First, on performance legitimacy, as noted above, in none of the 
countries covered are lay judges formally appraised by either professional 
judges or any other body, so appraisal cannot be used to rate performance 
legitimacy.74  A criterion that could be adopted, however, is the extent to 
which lay judges can utilize their employment experience; arguably the 
more closely this experience matches the labor market sector where the 
dispute arose, the more effective their performance should be (other things 
being equal).  As we have seen, there is considerable variation between 
 
 74. There is anecdotal evidence that in egregious instances, the professional judge informally 
suggests that a lay judge not be reappointed.  Furthermore, in Great Britain, for example, the Chief 
Justice has power to remove lay judges from office, but the present authors do not know of any instance 
of that power being used.  See Employment Tribunals Act, 1996, c. 17, § 5b (Eng.).   
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countries in the extent of matching, but it is not evident how the effect of 
matching on performance could be gauged.  
Another criterion of performance legitimacy is training, on the—
possibly questionable—assumption that lay judges come to “better” 
decisions the more training they have received.  In all the countries covered 
here, apart from Sweden, lay judges officially receive training, but the 
authors know of no assessment of how or whether training improves 
performance or of the quality of training of lay judges, and this is an area 
meriting further research.  
Performance legitimacy ultimately relies on some quantitative measure 
of the acceptability of decisions by those to which they apply.  However, 
there are great difficulties in developing such a quantitative measure, 
although some tentative conclusions can be drawn.  One important 
yardstick, possibly the most revealing of the acceptability of court decisions 
to participants and their vulnerability to challenge due to error, might be the 
number of appeals from decisions in which lay judges have been involved.  
This, however, is complicated by the fact that there is no appeal from the 
Swedish Labor Court, and elsewhere the grounds of appeal vary.  For 
instance, in Great Britain an appeal can only be made on a point of law.  In 
France and Germany, an appeal at the first appellate level can be made on 
fact and law where, inter alia , there is a specified amount at issue.  
Moreover, in Great Britain and France an appellant must pay a fee,75 but the 
amount differs; it is substantially higher in Great Britain.  Accordingly, 
achieving a consistent measure across countries is beset by serious 
problems of comparability.  
In the absence of such an “objective” measure, one is left with the 
acceptability of decisions by claimants and defendants.  This is a complex 
area, as it involves disentangling satisfaction with outcomes from views of 
the fairness of the process, that is a procedural justice perspective, and there 
is some debate about whether this can be done rigorously.76  At present, as 
noted above, there is a dearth of comparative empirical research that might 
begin to address the issue of how claimants and respondents cross-
nationally view the judicial process.  
As to regime legitimacy, one criterion that could be adopted is the 
representativeness of lay judges in terms of the extent to which they are 
typical of workers or employers.  All the countries considered here, except 
 
 75. In Germany, the loser pays the court fee at both first instance and appellate levels.  
[ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG] [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], as amended Oct. 20, 2013, § 91 (Ger.).  
 76. See, e.g., MARK PETERS ET AL., FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL 
APPLICATIONS 2008, at 87–88 (Department of Business, Innovations and Skills ed., 2010) (reporting 
survey finding that satisfaction with the adjudicative system was strongly associated with a favorable 
outcome).  Cf. Tyler, supra note 20 (opining that citizens distinguish between procedural issues and 
outcomes).  
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Great Britain with its system of self-nomination, would rate highly because 
nominations are made by the social partners.  However, if the criterion is 
shifted to that of reflecting the gender and ethnicity of workers, then Great 
Britain’s labor courts have higher legitimacy.  This is because in Great 
Britain, there is an emphasis on ensuring that lay judges reflect the gender 
and ethnicity of the population as a whole, but elsewhere such emphasis is 
muted.  Other characteristics of workers, however, such as age or level of 
income, are disregarded in all the countries considered here.  
If the criterion of regime legitimacy is the type of industry in the area, 
then Germany has potentially higher legitimacy because German public 
officials, at least in theory, can reject nominations of employer and worker 
lay judges if they do not reflect the social and economic structure of the 
locality.  Otherwise, key characteristics of employers relevant to the social 
and economic structure, such as company size, are not taken into account in 
the countries examined here.  
A further potential criterion of regime legitimacy is the perceptions of 
users, the dominant approach for procedural justice theories.  A comparison 
would have to be drawn between parties’ perceptions where the case is 
decided by the professional judge alone, compared to perceptions where a 
case is decided by both a professional judge and lay judges.  Such a 
comparison could only be carried out in Great Britain, due to the fact that 
similar cases can be adjudicated by employment tribunals with differing 
compositions.  
As to polity legitimacy, this may be engendered prima facie if actors 
perceive concordance between different institutions, but research is needed 
into actors’ perceptions.  Meanwhile it should be noted that there is a 
degree of fit between the labor courts and the wider industrial relations 
context of each of the countries covered here, as there is between the labor 
courts and the varieties of capitalism typology (coordinated economies and 
liberal market economies), Ireland apart.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
To conclude, this Article has demonstrated the considerable 
differences between countries in how lay judges in labor courts are selected 
and deployed.  Moreover, although Novitz and Syrpis offer a richer 
conceptual framework for addressing issues of legitimacy than the narrower 
focus of some procedural justice research, a number of challenges remain, 
in particular in terms of operationalizing and measuring legitimacy in a 
robust and quantitative way cross-nationally.  
Why should we want to compare the legitimacy of different countries’ 
judicial arrangements, even if it were possible?  We maintain that the 
BURGESS ET AL 35-2 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2014  2:23 PM 
2014] LAY JUDGES AND LABOR COURTS 215 
legitimacy of mechanisms for resolving individual rights disputes is part of 
a wider perspective on the extent to which employment systems generate 
conflict, the extent to which this is individual and collective, and the 
institutions that exist to enable such conflicts to be resolved.  Given the 
widespread decline of collective means for resolving disputes at the 
workplace, the legitimacy of institutions dealing with individual rights 
disputes is becoming increasingly salient.  
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